SRI LANKA AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE
by Olga Yoldi
Fifty-two years after independence
Sri Lanka has yet to master the fine art of nation building. Stuck
in a war of attrition for the past 18 years there is still no
foreseeable hope of peace. Broken pledges, militarism and peace
plans that never saw the light of day, have so far prevented a
negotiated settlement. But can Sri Lanka afford an endless war?
OLGA YOLDI writes.
Kumar was just 12 years old when
he smashed the head of a Muslim baby against a wall during an
attack on a village. He later described how he felt no remorse
about killing the child and then hacking to death the mother.
In fact he said they deserved to die. The attack had been organised
by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the armed Tamil
opposition group fighting against the Sri Lankan army for an independent
state called Tamil Eelam.
Such incidents have been all too frequent during the violence
and counter-violence that have torn Sri Lanka apart along ethnic
lines for the last 2 decades.
So far the conflict has cost more than 60,000 lives, produced
over one million internally displaced people, 11,000 disappeared
and 800,000 Tamil refugees and more than 20,000 permanently wounded
are languishing in silence in many corners of the country.
The war has contributed to the ecological destruction and depopulation
of the traditional Tamil homelands (northern and eastern areas)
and has made a pauper of the Sri Lankan economy.
Last October the Peoples Alliance led by Chandrika Kumaratunga,
won more seats in the parliamentary elections than the United
National Party (UNP) opposition, but lost the one-seat majority
and now requires the support of minority parties. Chandrika, who
was forced to withdraw her Devolution Bill from Parliament, promised
she would reintroduce it again. However she is facing bitter opposition
from the Sinhalist majority, particularly from the powerful Buddhist
clergy.
The Devolution Plan, which caused a great deal of controversy,
was to give Tamil speaking areas of the north and east more control
over their affairs. Unfortunately it was never implemented because
protests by Buddhist monks forced the President to withdraw it
from Parliament.
Tamil Tigers separatists leader Velupillai Prabhakaran announced
that his group was finally ready for unconditional peace talks
with the Sri Lankan government to end the conflict. In his annual
HeroesDay speech last December, Prabhakaran called on the
government to create a climate of good will by ending its economic
blockade of Tamil controlled areas of Sri Lanka and scaling down
the war.
But the government has not responded, President Chandrika Kumaratunga
not only distrusts Prabhakaran but has rejected offers of mediation
made by Norway, Palestine and Australia. The government
has no interest in a cease-fire because only when it was weak
did the Tigers want one. Prime Minister Ratnasari Wickremanayake
said. He was quoted by the New York Times as saying that the government
planned to carry on the war until the enemy is totally eliminated.
In a polarised nation such as Sri Lanka compromise and cooperation
are rare. The question is, how long can they prolong an unwinnable
war?
TWO NATIONS ONE PEOPLE
Ceylon (the country bore its name until 1972 when it became Sri
Lanka) once consisted of different kingdoms. The island was inhabited
from time immemorial by two peoples who spoke different languages,
belonged to different faiths, had different cultures and lived
in exclusive areas.
According to Historian S. Pathmanathan, Tamils have lived in Sri
Lanka since pre historic times. They originated from Dravidian
South India and crossed the island by foot before it became separated
from the mainland by the Ocean.
The Sinhalese, who constitute a Buddhist majority (74%) describe
themselves as being of Indo Aryan stock, who originated from northern
India and regard themselves as the legitimate people of Sri Lanka
- a belief that feeds a disastrous attitude towards the Tamil
minority and lies at the heart of the conflict.
Tamils and Sinhalese once called themselves communities now they
describe themselves as nations, emphasizing their rival claims
for nationhood Ceylon was occupied by the Portuguese, who arrived
in 1505 in search of cinnamon. Through a treaty with the Kandian
king they gained control of most of the ports. From the late 1660s
it was occupied by the Dutch. The Portuguese and Dutch administered
the Tamil and Sinhalese areas as separate entities, but the British,
who conquered the island in 1815, fused them into one crown colony
for their own administrative convenience. This resulted in the
Tamils becoming smaller in numbers compared with the Sinhalese
in the unified country.
As long as the British rule lasted, Sinhalese and Tamils had reasons
to believe that they were equal. The British used a system of
communal representation. British governors themselves nominated
representatives from Tamil and Sinhalese elite families to the
Legislative Council (introduced in 1833).
In the first decades of the 20th century however, English educated
Sinhalese began to agitate for territorial representation, demanding
that members of the legislative council be elected by their constituencies,
rather than nominated by British governors. But the sheer disparity
in numbers provided the Sinhalese with the monopoly of power and
Tamils began to feel apprehensive about Sinhalese domination.
Tamil leader GG Ponnambalan conducted a one man campaign to protect
Ceylon Tamil interests. He pushed for a balanced territorial representation
of 50-50, half of the seats in the legislature and executive for
the minority communities (Tamil, Muslims, Indian Tamils and Burghers).
He did not succeed.
The problem was temporarily resolved with the formation of the
Ceylon National Congress in 1919. It was agreed that despite the
introduction of the territorial principle, a communal ratio in
representation would be maintained in some form, assuring the
Tamils of their fair share in territorial constituencies in the
area.
When independence was being negotiated in 1946 the British did
make some provisions in the proposed constitution for the protection
of the minorities, and demanded that the Sinhalese obtain the
consent of the Tamils for the complete transfer of power to the
people of Ceylon. It was relying on these safeguards that the
Tamils accepted the unitary Constitution and agreed to Britain
transferring power to a unified Ceylon. Unfortunately no real
constitutional mechanism provided for Tamils to share power at
the centre as a matter of right, and this fundamental flaw would
haunt Sri Lanka for years to come.
In November 1945, D.S. Senanayake, the so-called architect of
Sinhala independence, leader of the State Council told the Tamils:
I give the minorities the sincere assurance that no harm
need you fear at our hands in a free Sri Lanka. Do you want to
be governed from London, or do your want, as Ceylonese, to help
govern Ceylon? But his promises were never to be fulfilled
and Tamils soon found themselves shifting from the centre to the
periphery of society.
KM de Silva writes in his book The History of Sri Lanka: The
situation changed fundamentally when instead of two majority communities
and the minorities, there was one majority community- the Sinhalese,
the Tamils now regarding themselves as a minority community.
MAJORITY VERSUS MINORITY
In 1948 Ceylon boasted the most powerful economy in Asia after
Japan. Ana Pararajasingham in his book Sri Lanka: One Island Two
Nations, writes: the island certainly possessed many of
the attributes to evolve into a successful modern state. It had
the highest literacy rate in the whole of Asia, had enjoyed universal
franchise since 1931 (longer than any of the other colonies) and
possessed a healthy economy. Now it squanders 20 per cent
of its meagre income on war, depends on economic aid for its survival
and most people struggle against poverty.
The departure of the British was amicable and uneventful, unlike
the horror of Indian independence, but as soon as independence
was gained Prime Minister D.S. Sananayake disenfranchised one
million Indian Tamils. He then proceeded to enact the Council
Amendment Act, which reduced Tamil representation in Parliament
by nine seats. The ratio was further reduced in the 1950s by state
aided settlement of Sinhalese peasants in traditional Tamil provinces,
in a deliberate attempt to change the ethnic composition of those
areas.
The one calamitous decision that led to ethnic tension was the
Sinhala-only Legislation of 1956. In the face of a storm of protest
from the Tamils, the Sri Lankan Freedom Party under the leadership
of SWRD Bandarainake enacted the Sinhala-only Act, making Sinhala
the only official language in Ceylon. Sinhala replaced English
as the countrys official language. This made the entire
Tamil population illiterate overnight and served to keep the Tamils
away from education and professional employment.
The Sinhala-only Act had been Bandaranaikes election manifesto.
As soon as he was in power he wasted no time in fulfilling his
promises. It proved to be a potent vote catcher
his
victory sent a clear signal to the Sinhala politicians that an
anti-Tamil stand was a powerful platform to win votes, Pararajasingham
writes.
Tamils staged a campaign of civil disobedience but their peaceful
protests were crushed by military action, resulting in hundreds
killed and thousands escaping to the Tamil homelands.
In the face of so much opposition Bandarainake sought to mitigate
the rigors of the Sinhala Only Act by signing a Pact with SJV
Chelvanayakan, Leader of the Tamil Party. The B-C Pact provided
for Regional Councils with powers in agriculture, education as
well as the use of Tamil as the language of administration in
the Northern and Eastern Provinces. But the Pact was rejected
by the mounting Sinhalese opposition led by J.R. Jayawardene and
by the fierce resistance of Buddhist monks. As a result it was
finally abandoned. Bandarainake was assassinated by a Buddhist
monk two years later.
District councils were presented as a solution to the Tamil problem
and formed the basis of a new Pact signed in 1965 between Prime
Minister Dudley Senanayake (nephew of the first Prime Minister)
and Chelvanayakam. But once again mounting opposition by the Buddhist
clergy forced Senanayake to abort the Pact. Buddhist monks have
had a long history of opposing any proposals made by the government
to appease Tamil Aspirations. For Buddhist monks any weakening
of the central state is a weakening of Buddhism in Sri Lanka.
Dr Jehan Perera from the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka said.
The rise of Tamil militancy took a decisive turn in 1972 when
Mrs Sirimano Bandaranaike (SWRD Bandarainakes widow and
the world first woman Prime Minister), leader of the SLFP introduced
the Two Systems of Standardisation of marks for admission to university.
Tamil students would need to score higher grades than Sinhalese
to gain university entry. This policy inflamed the wrath of Tamil
youth who by that stage had become impatient with the governments
policies.
1972 also saw the birth of a new Constitution. Sri Lanka was proclaimed
a Buddhist Republic. Buddhism was made the state religion and
the amendments proposed by the Tamil members of parliament were
rejected, compelling them to walk out of the Constituent Assembly.
Ethnic tensions were aggravated when the Jaffna Public Library
with a collection of over 95,000 invaluable and unique Tamil manuscripts
was burnt down by the police. This was the worst possible attack
on Tamil culture.
In view of the increasing military repression and marginalisation
of the Tamil community, Tamil political parties now under the
banner of Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) committed themselves
to the restoration of a separate state of Tamil Eelam based on
the right of self determination inherent in every nation. This
was formally endorsed at the TULFs Convention in Vaddukoddai
in 1976. One year later the TULF secured the highest number of
seats ever in the general elections of July 1977. Their mandate
was to establish Tamil Eelam by peaceful means or otherwise, but
the road to Jaffna would prove long and difficult because the
same general elections had also returned to power Junius Jayawardene,
notorious for his anti Tamil stands, with a huge majority.
Open hostilities between the military and the Tamils began in
July 1983 when 3,000 Tamils were murdered by Sinhalese, in retaliation
for the killing of 13 Sinhalese soldiers by Tamil Tigers. Sinhalese
mobs went on a rampage burning, looting, killing Tamils and destroying
their properties, in one of the worst outbreaks of violence in
the history of Sri Lanka. It later appeared that some government
officers had been involved in instigating the rioters. Thousands
of Tamils fled from Colombo to the north. One hundred and sixty
thousand people left Sri Lanka as refugees. At least 139,000 of
these crossed to Tamil Nadu in South India, where they remain
until now.
To make matters worse the same year Jayawardene decided to declare
Sri Lanka a unitary state with the passing of the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution, which made it an offense to espouse the creation
of a separate state. This required Tamil members of Parliament
to take an oath of allegiance to the unitary state of Sri Lanka.
But TULF MPs refused to sign, quit Parliament and fled to India.
The leadership vacuum left by their departure was soon to be filled
by Velippillai Prabhakran and his Tamil Liberation Tigers, who
seized the opportunity to establish his leadership in the Tamil
areas. As A. Jeyaratnam Wilson writes Parliamentarism would
soon be replaced by the gun in the freedom struggle and moderates
would soon be displaced by the militant movement of Tamil youth.
A low intensity conflict was to develop into a full-blown civil
war, a war that neither side would manage to win.
NOTHING BUT PROMISES
Writer Robert A. Heilein once said that Politics was the most
important invention of the human race, because it is the only
way to solve disputes without killing people.
This has certainly not been the case in Sri Lanka. Politics have
repeatedly failed to bring an end to the war. As the conflict
escalated and while the country was torn by violence, hundreds
of public and secret meetings took place between the government
and the LTTE or the TULF. Researcher Rohan Gunaratne observes
that between July 1983 to 1987 the President must have held at
least 136 meetings. Throughout the years all attempts to find
peace through accords, peace plans and negotiations failed.
This was the case at the All Party Conference in 1983 where the
Tamils first put forward their demand for Provincial Councils
that ended in a fiasco.
The peace talks in the Himalayan city of Thimpu in 1985 did not
achieve anything. They ended with bitterness on both sides
and mutual recrimination, writes Jeyaratnam Wilson. Tamils
wanted three basic principles to be accepted. That they were a
nation, the right to self-determination and their right to equal
citizenship. The government refused to accept these principles.
The talks were abandoned when the Tamils received news of an army
massacre of Tamil civilians.
India offered its assistance as a mediator to negotiate peace
between warring parties when the conflict came to Indias
doorstep after the July 83 riots. India also feared that Sri Lankas
Trincomalee harbour would become available to the US government
as a naval base. The Indo-Lanka Accord was drafted by Prime Minister
Jayewardene and Rajiv Ghandi in 1987. It committed India to provide
military assistance to Sri Lanka for the implementation of a number
of measures that would create peace, such as the disarming of
the LTTE; the union of the Northern and Eastern provinces into
a single administrative unit, with a provincial council; the return
of Sri Lankan military to their barracks and the official use
of the Tamil language.
The Accord was signed amidst severe opposition and violent protest.
Tamils believed it to be an agreement between India and Sri Lanka,
aimed at securing Indian interests in the region, having little
to do with the rights of Tamils. On the other hand Sinhalese were
not happy either as they saw it as a potential threat to the unity
of the country.
The Indo Lanka Accord called for the deployment of Indian Peace
Keeping Forces (IPKF). Eight thousand Indian troops moved into
Sri Lanka soon after the Accord was announced. Initially they
were welcomed by the Tamils but soon resented their presence,
particularly when the IPKF launched an offensive against LTTE
bases in Jaffna and attacked Tamil civilians. The IPKF returned
to India in 1991. The LTTE occupied Jaffna and the Indo-Lanka
Agreement was never implemented.
Much hope was placed by the Tamil community in the 1995 Peace
talks. This time between Chandrika Kumaratunga and the LTTE. The
government offered a package that became the basis for the negotiation,
but there was little substance to it and the LTTE gave up. Historian
John Powers said in a conference: In walking out of the
negotiations they [LTTE] showed the world that they were unwilling
to negotiate. Even if the government was not offering much it
would have been better for their public image to have stayed in
the negotiations. The Tamil leadership has become so radicalised
that it is very hard to imagine that they are going to be able
to agree to anything that any Sri Lankan government can propose.
A MILITARY SOLUTION TO A POLITICAL PROBLEM
Intransigence seems to be the norm in Sri Lanka. The most uncompromising
player in Sri Lanka is believed to be Velupillai Prabhakaran,
who has a reputation of being ruthless and inflexible. It
was the plight of the Tamil people that compelled me to take up
arms. I felt outraged at the inhuman atrocities perpetrated against
an innocent people. I felt that an armed struggle was the only
alternative left to our people, not only to ensure our survival
but ultimately to free ourselves from the Sinhala oppression.
He said to a BBC journalist in 1986.
Prabhakaran believes that the Tamil problem will never be resolved
through parliament: The Tamil people have been expressing
their grievances in Parliament for more than three decades. Their
voices went unheard like cries in the wilderness. In Sri Lanka
there is no parliamentary democracy where our people could effectively
represent their aspirations. What passes as Parliament is an authoritarian
rule founded on the tyranny of the majority. Parliamentary politics
not only has failed but it was through Parliament that several
discriminatory and oppressive laws have been directed against
the Tamil people, he added.
But the Tigers have systematically decimated the entire Tamil
democratic leadership, accusing them of being collaborationists
and infiltrators. The opportunistic politics of the TULF
is retarding the liberation struggle. They have never taken any
concrete steps to further the struggle. On the contrary they give
false hopes, create illusions, and try to keep our people in perpetual
bondage...They never had any sincere intentions to liberate our
oppressed people nor did they ever put forward any concrete programme
of political action he said.
Ana Pararajasingham explains: Prabhakaran has been demonised
by the media constantly but he is very committed to his cause.
Most Tamils support the LTTE quite strongly. The types of leaders
we have had in the past were not strong enough, that has been
our problem.
Prabhakaran now leads a band of more than 5,000 indoctrinated
and committed guerrillas with a reputation of being the worlds
deadliest. Every soldier must swear an oath of loyalty to Prabhakaran
and must wear a deadly suicide capsule around their necks that
will be swallowed if they are caught by the military. A young
Tiger explains their philosophy: The thought of certain
death is a great trial, but to whom? Certainly not to us because
we are married to our cyanide. Yes, our death lives with us. It
sleeps with us. We carry it in our shirt pockets and around our
necks. This makes us clear headed and purposeful.
Many sources said that the power of the LTTE lies essentially
in their cause. The Tamil community perceives them as the only
ones capable of defending the Tamil cause, therefore, recruitment
and mobilization, especially after any heavy LTTE casualties,
are massive. Tigers are recruited from schools and villages. Most
of them belong to a generation that have known nothing but war.
They have joined the LTTE because of their direct experience of
oppression. After they die, their portraits join those of other
martyrs at the LTTE headquarters in the Wanni, the Tigers
traditional forest stronghold.
Prabhakaran has kept the fight going against a demoralised army
for nearly two decades in his quest for independent statehood.
Lately however he has announced that he would consider other options.
Prabhakaran explains Revolutionary Socialism is my political
philosophy. By philosophy I mean the construction of an egalitarian
society where there is no class contradiction and exploitation
of man by man; a free, rational society where human freedom and
rights are protected and progress enhanced. Che Guevara is the
guerrilla leader that inspires me most
Most commentators say that the Tamil Diaspora is the only single
factor that sustains the LTTE in its war. According to Parajasingham,
the Tigers secure huge amounts of arms and ammunition from the
Sri Lankan army. The money from the Tamil Diaspora goes
to refugee rehabilitation projects, orphanages and things like
that. Tamils abroad simply dont have the financial power
to sustain an organisation such as the LTTE, he adds. Christopher
Kremmer wrote in his article Fortunes still being build
on a war without end: Tigers income comes partly
from a worldwide chain of businesses, including shipping lines,
travel agencies, shops and money changers, augmented by weapons
and drug smuggling.
The Indian Tamils support for militancy diminished especially
after the assassination of Rajiv Gandi supposedly by a Tamil suicide
bomber.
President Jayewardene sought military assistance from many countries.
We are prepared to align ourselves with the devil of terrorism,
he said. Around $US2 million per day is being provided to the
Sri Lankan government by the Aid Ceylon Consortium which consists
of Britain, Canada, France, Germany and Japan. The USA has also
helped Sri Lankan military in counter terrorism, as well as China
and Pakistan. India no longer provides military assistance to
Sri Lanka.
A WAR BEHIND CLOSED DOORS
There are no television cameras showing the world the atrocities
being committed in Sri Lanka. Unlike the Bosnian and Kosovar conflicts
that were fully exposed to the world, in Sri Lankan television
cameras are not showing the humanitarian crisis the war creates,
or the human rights violations it produces or the sheer suffering
experienced by civilians. Independent press coverage of the war
remains difficult if not impossible.
Human rights violations have been committed on both sides and
both sides have suffered as a result of the war. According to
Human Rights Watch, discrimination against Tamil civilians by
members of the security forces (attempting to root out the LTTE)
and large-scale arbitrary arrests of Tamils, continues in many
parts of the country. In the north and east residents have been
subjected to continuous harassment, routine beatings, torture,
systematic rape of Tamil women and public humiliation. There has
been summary prosecution of detainees and detainees being used
for forced labour by the army as well as indiscriminate shelling
and bombing of civilians. This is increasingly complicated by
the actions of Tamil paramilitary groups, often working alongside
the army as auxiliary forces, but sometimes at odds with them
and with each other.
The LTTE has also been responsible for gross human rights violations
in Jaffna and elsewhere, including indiscriminate killings of
civilians during attacks on checkpoints or army patrols and summary
executions of suspected informants, for harassment of other noncombatants
and intimidation of political opponents.
The Tamil people have been subjected to enormous suffering as
a consequence of the economic embargo, fishing bans and the blockade
on traffic imposed by the Sri Lankan army. Tamil people continue
to leave the Jaffna peninsula where landholders are taxed by LTTE
and other groups and cultivation is hampered by shelling and strafing.
Many fields have been abandoned because of land mines.
But peace is sought desperately. As Rev Dr SJ Emmanuel, Vicar
General of the Diocese of Jaffna said in1996 when he came to Australia:
We want peace because we are dying in war. We want peace
because we have lost all our dear and near ones in this senseless
war. We want peace because war is suffocating us into extinction.
We want peace because that alone is the natural space for human
life with dignity and self respect.
For years Sri Lankans have felt forgotten and abandoned by the
world. The reaction of the international community has been to
treat the war as an internal conflict, and to adopt a policy of
non-interference in Sri Lankan affairs. It seems as if the international
community had decided to remove Sri Lanka from the international
agenda and to relegate the armed conflict to the status of a forgotten
war.
Tamil Lawyer VP Lingajothy in his book Sri Lanka, The State
against the Tamils writes: the world seems to be preoccupied
with countries that conform to certain predefined criteria: Countries
that are populated by white Caucasians, that have valuable natural
resources, or have strategic importance to larger world powers
and countries with major religious influence. Sri Lanka,
according to him, does not seem to fall into any of these categories.
Although it could be argued that Sri Lanka is strategically placed
and that Trincomalee harbour attracts interests from the American
Navy, the presence of naval base at Diego Garcia in the Indian
Ocean has lessened the appeal of Trincomalee as a potential strategic
military port. According to Lingajothy, Western interests in Sri
Lanka for the purpose of trade have little appeal as there are
other countries in the area such as Singapore, Malaysia and India
which have a greater market potential than Sri Lanka.
This raises one major question:
Will there ever be peace in that island?
Last year the Sri Lankan government raised military spending by
US$358 million, taking the defense budget up to one third of Sri
Lankan GDP. Although there is dissent over the cost of war, a
macabre war dependency seems to have developed over the years.
The army has increased and become a powerful player in Sri Lanka
and even many have been making good profits from the war. Christopher
Kremmer writes although illegal commissions are believed
to be paid on all big arms deals and bribery lets military supplies
for the Tigers pass through Colombo port, there has not been a
single successful prosecution of a senior military officer for
corruption.
Even the major parties in Sri Lanka continue to use the war not
only to increase their power but to distract attention from the
enormous economic and social problems affecting the country and
from their failure to govern.
The paradox behind the tragedy that Tamils face in Sri Lanka today
is that, more than a half century after attaining self-rule, they
are worse off than under British colonialism! The reason being
that in the process of leaving Sri Lanka, the British left behind
a colonial legacy of democracy which meant the ethnic majority
would always remain in power.
While the Chandrika Kumaratungas government cannot afford
to continue this war endlessly she continues to refuse offers
of external mediation. It seems that she will not solve the conflict
but will not allow anybody else to help solve it. Her failure
to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament for
her devolution package was a lost opportunity.
The LTTE extended the cease-fire once again. This presents an
opportunity to start negotiations and reach a settlement once
and for all, but this time in the presence of a third party. The
role of the international community is vital in the resolution
of this conflict. It would have to be a settlement that enforces
compromises on both sides and accommodates both Tamils and Sinhalese
within the framework of one nation, ore under a new structure
Only then can the government start to perfect the art of nation
building.
Reference
An Appeal to The United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Tamil
Centre for Human Rights, 1994
Powers J. The Conflict -An Historical Overview.
Ponnambalam GG The Intransigence of the Singhalese. Peace with
Justice International Conference on the Conflict in Sri Lanka.
Austrlian Human Rights Foundation and Australasian Federation
of Tamil Associations.
Amnesty International: Ethnicity and Nationality, Refugees in
Asia. 1997
Sivanayagam S The State Against the Tamils Historical Overview,
International Tamil Foundation UK June 2000
Lingajothy VP Genocide - A Crime Against Humanity An Indictment
Against Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka The State Against the Tamils, June
2000
Long Road to Jaffna, The Situation of Sri Lankas Tamil Refugees,
Jesuit Refugee Service Asia Pacific.
Greenaway Jon Between the Lion and the Tiger, Eureka
Street , November 2000
Pararajasingham A. Sri Lanka One Island Two Nations International
Federation of Tamils, London June 1992
Kremmer C. Fortunes still being built on a war without end.
Sydney Morning Herald 9/10/2000
Wilson AJ Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism. Its Origins and Development
in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Hurst and Company, London, 2000.
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